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SPENDING ON DIME NOW -WINNING LASTING PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN
The war in Afghanistan will soon become the longest war the United States has ever fought on foreign soil. The recent national policy debate over this issue affirms the tenuous nature of our continued presence. We are now faced with the paradox of preventing a Vietnam-type defeat by staying the course or giving Al Qaeda and similar terrorist groups a significant victory by failing to complete the mission of securing Afghanistan. President Obama and Gen. McCrystal's new strategy to win the war in Afghanistan focuses on a short-term objective of "securing the people." But it falls short of any credible long-term strategy to improve the underlying conditions that enable the insurgency to flourish and thereby facilitate the eventual withdrawal of U.S. soldiers from the country. As a classic example of a "failed state," Afghanistan's failure to achieve genuine sovereignty is deep-seated. Simply strengthening its internal governance mechanisms will not suffice. The United States and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) have an opportunity to execute an integrated nation-building strategy in Afghanistan that addresses both short-term security requirements and longterm development and governance efforts necessary to restore Afghan sovereignty and bring peace and security to the region.
Taliban insurgent groups organized at the operational level consist of three groups 1 of disaffected foot soldiers who fight for various combinations of tribal pride, economic opportunity, anti-government sentiment (for justice, against corruption), and religious ideology. 2 A successful counter-insurgency strategy will effectively and efficiently employ national power assets to combat, co-opt, and subvert these disaffected groups to win the "war of the people." Given the recent U.S. national debate over Afghanistan strategy and our military leaders' recent research in counterinsurgency doctrine and nation-building, it is critical that a smart application of national power resources be brought to bear to defeat the insurgency in the long-term. We must efficiently and effectively employ our Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) elements of national power to accomplish U.S. foreign policy goals in the region.
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This paper examines Gen. Stanley McCrystal's counter-insurgency strategy for
Afghanistan in the context of a counter-insurgency "DIME" paradigm organized along four specific Lines of Operation (LoO): security, governance, development, and strategic communications. 4 The Current COIN Strategy Each section of this paper analyzes the background and current
Afghan state of affairs regarding each LoO. This analysis then addresses problematic issues that may prevent the successful realization of the goals of each LoO. Finally, this paper offers recommendations to strengthen the strategy in order to achieve an acceptable level of security necessary to allow the successful gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces beginning in July 2011.
Two primary documents articulate the counter-insurgency strategy pursued by framework for "securing the population" in the short-term. They provide a fairly detailed analysis of the challenges in governance, development, and strategic communications that complicate our efforts to "win the people" in the long war in Afghanistan. "Winning of the people" over the long-term is certainly a wicked challenge for coalition forces.
The ICMCP presents a coordinated US State Department and Department of Defense "whole of government" approach to integrate and synchronize civil-military teams working across security, development, and governance lines of operation. 5 The document identifies "11 counter-insurgency transformative effects" 6 The COMISAF Initial Assessment endorses much of the strategy outlined in the ICMCP, including the 11 counter-insurgency transformative effects. This document formally advocates the new strategic "focus on the population," which rests on four main pillars: 1) improve effectiveness through greater partnering with ANSF; 2) prioritize responsive and accountable governance; 3) gain the initiative; and 4) focus resources.
with prioritized objectives for each effect. The strategy is designed to achieve these objectives in 12-18 months. While this document sets many end-state goals, it does not include a strategic action plan on how to accomplish them. 7 Line of Operation: Security
While the COMISAF Initial Assessment thoroughly addresses the military security strategy, it less specifically provides actionable objectives regarding the other elements of national power needed to win the COIN fight in the long-term.
The central aim of the new COIN strategy for Afghanistan focuses on securing the Afghan population through military means. Historically, this concept is fully developed in counter-insurgency literature; theorists such as David Galula claim that the "counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent." 8 Indeed, a RAND Corporation study found that "successful counter-insurgency operations require not only the capability of the United
States to conduct unconventional war, but, most important, the ability to shape the capacity of the indigenous government and its security forces." 9 For this reason, the first pillar of the new strategy to "improve effectiveness through greater partnering with ANSF" is suggested by theory at the outset: securing the population is vital to both short-and long-term strategic success.
The multinational ISAF faces three challenges in improving the quantity and quality of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), affecting ANSF's ability to effectively secure the population from insurgents. First, after over five years of training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA), many units are still unable to conduct independent and sustained operations in the field; such operations are critical to counter-insurgency success. Second, the Afghan National Police (ANP) remain a serious impediment to providing population security, yet for many Afghans the ANP are the daily face of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA).
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According to the Asia Foundation, the Afghan National Army (ANA) remains one of the most respected institutions of the Government of Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, Afghans generally see corruption and incompetence in that face; it is not the comforting face of security. Finally, the sustained future growth and effectiveness of the ANSF is directly tied to the ability to attract and retain the 'best and brightest' Afghans. Finally, training, equipping, and fielding a professional host nation security force in the midst of fighting a persistent insurgency is enormously difficult. Satisfactorily addressing the aforementioned three challenges will improve ANSF's capability to conduct tactical force-on-force engagements against Taliban fighters in the short-term.
Further, it will enable institutional reforms necessary for sustaining a credible professional force necessary to ensure security in the long-term. What remains to be seen is whether the new COIN strategy will produce an ANSF that is proficient in conducting long-term counter-insurgency warfare. Agile Afghan National Security
Forces will be required to conduct independent operations while building community support by "winning the hearts and minds" of those they seek to protect. The enormity of this task is evident in the ongoing challenges faced by the highly trained U.S. military to subdue the insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Given that time is on the side of the insurgents, it becomes even more urgent to train the ANSF at the outset to conduct this most challenging type of warfare in order to meet the short-term objective of securing the Afghan people through military means.
Line of Operation: Governance
The second pillar of the McCrystal strategy calls for defeating the insurgency through "responsive and accountable governance." 13 This task is essential for winning the "hearts and minds" campaign of the counter-insurgency effort. In academic nationbuilding literature, Afghanistan exhibits a "creeping sovereignty gap" because its government has been historically unable to provide essential services to the people.
14 Moreover, as Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest countries and it has used practically every type of government known to mankind in the last century, including monarchy, military government, communism, anarchy, theocracy, and constitutional democracy. 15 Each of these attempts to establish Westphalian central state control over a complex mosaic of independent and geographically separated tribes, ethnicities, and cultures has been relatively short-lived. The often violent overthrow and replacement of the central state political apparatus has reinforced attitudes among rural Afghans that the "state" is not to be trusted. As Goodson summarizes: "the multitude of Afghan governance suggests that formal systems of government are not well established, but informal governance (local jirga-shura system)…has wide legitimacy." 16 might have merit as a mechanism for regional and local elites to reclaim some power. Moreover, rechanneling government funding through elected rather than appointed officials will increase the effectiveness of population-centric projects -and thus legitimize the central government. 19 The Afghan constitution requires the president to be elected by 50% + 1 of the votes cast in a direct voting process; a run-off election is held in two weeks following the election if the absolute majority threshold is not reached in the first round.
Karzai's efforts to shape the future electoral process were designed to advance his personal ambitions to be President. In addition to reform of the executive branch, the process for electing the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) members of the lower house of the Afghan National
Assembly is equally important and closely linked to improved legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan political process. Currently, the Wolesi Jirga is elected through the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, which, can be attributed to Hamid Karzai's desire for "a fragmented opposition in the legislature, rather than strong and disciplined political parties." 23 Anyone who has watched Afghan television knows that this is a dysfunctional and inefficient political process that strengthens provincial perceptions of illegitimate governance. A reconsideration of a list-based proportional representation (PR) system as a mechanism to foster political parties in the Wolesi Jirga 24 should be explored in an effort to increase grass root political participation at the local level. Although critics may voice concerns regarding the possibility of ethnic, tribal, or religious political parties further stressing an already fractured society, these concerns are preemptively addressed in Article 35 of the Afghan constitution, which specifically forbids formations of parties along such lines. 25 Another opportunity to build a viable Afghan political structure is the consolidation of multiple elections with national implications that will take place in Afghanistan over the next 13 years. Some form of national election will occur in every year except three until the year 2023. Many observers point to the difficulties that modern democratic states still encounter when running "routine" elections. 26 Voter fatigue and resulting malaise will likely occur with Afghans voters, especially if they do not see significant or satisfactory changes in local, regional, or national policy -or in the quality of their lives.
For the singular practical reason of fighting the current insurgency and for sake of simplicity, this process needs to be simplified through a consolidation of elections.
Again, this can be accomplished through an informal process such as the current delays, until a better electoral system is legally adopted. This quick solution will ease the burdens on ANSF and ISAF soldiers charged with election security; it will also reduce the political turmoil that an almost yearly electoral change would likely produce.
Consolidation will also reduce the very likely chance that a multiplicity of national elections will create voter fatigue that leads to malaise and one more Afghan grievance against the central government.
Since the introduction of U.S. forces into Afghanistan, engagement of the Afghan political-governing apparatus can be summarized as personality-centric engagement.
That is, it focuses on reforming individual personalities such as President Karzai, rather than reform of the political model itself. Given Afghans' historical tolerance for corrupt governance that contributes to the "arc of crisis" that characterizes Central Asian governments, 27 reform of the Afghan governing structure should also be explored. For, as Katharine Adeney points out, "institutions matter." Turkmenistan. The majority of this power goes to the capital city Kabul. 38 Another area for economic growth is promoting the licit Afghan agriculture sector, which is a major source of income and livelihood for approximately 85% of the Afghan population.
Much of the country goes without power, despite untapped potential hydroelectric resources throughout the country. A concerted effort to develop internal sources of electrical generating power is fundamentally important to Afghanistan's long-term economic development. 39 In addition to an inadequate electrical infrastructure that keeps local Afghan companies from processing, storing, and transporting foodstuffs to market, the country's well-documented illicit opium crops compete for the 12% of arable land that was previously devoted to self-sustaining agriculture production. An integrated economic development plan would link transit, agriculture, electricity, and production projects to enable Afghan farmers to profit from products that are currently years, then a focused effort to provide a comprehensive economic development plan should be pursued along with the surge of forces in order to guarantee stability that will allow our eventual withdrawal from the country. While the current emphasis on fighting the Taliban and protecting the Afghan population is critical, the failure to develop an economic plan that produces corresponding results will continue to frustrate any measureable economic gains from being realized then the systemic corruption and human capital that feeds the insurgency will continue to do so. Economic development and security are inextricably linked in determining the future viability of the GoA. The issue of economic development often gets 'wished away' by military leaders in the hope that some unidentified other competent entity will take this task on. Or, as Goodson states, "let the Afghans do it." 42 But, the economic LoO provides long-term stabilization that can co-opt insurgent human capital and provide government legitimacy through the promise of economic security and future self-worth. In this case, hope is not an option.
Afghanistan's economic development cannot be left to chance. Communications Plan would achieve effects down to the tactical level. Likewise, increased investments in Afghan media infrastructure and training local Afghan media specialists to provide authentic and credible print, radio, and television messages would greatly enhance Strategic Communications. As with any good political or product-driven advertising campaign, it will take an investment now to realize Strategic
Communications gains in both the short and long-term.
Spending On DIME Now -To Win Lasting Peace In Afghanistan
The new McCrystal strategy must be complemented by additional resources in Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (the DIME acronym) elements of national power to win a lasting peace in Afghanistan. Nearly a decade of meager investments in the DIME under the Bush administration has prompted the recent public debate over future Afghan strategy. Ironically, the stubborn resistance of both the Bush to Obama administrations 55 The unfortunate reality is that the United States cannot turn back the clock on Afghanistan to fix the mistakes of the past eight years. Given Afghanistan's numerous tribes, languages, and ethnicities, and given centuries of isolated and non-governed existence, any "quick-fix" strategy is doomed to failure. Counter-insurgency theory poses a significant risk to the new McCrystal strategy in Afghanistan. That is, neither administration has acknowledged the contextual elements of time, money, and space necessary for any strategy in Afghanistan to succeed.
informs us that successful counterinsurgencies are long-term affairs: counter-insurgents must take away "time" as an asset of the insurgent. 56 If the assessment by some experts that the Afghan insurgent strategy is to "run out the game clock," 57 date is a cultural mindset among coalition forces of fighting a short-term "one-tour" war, rather than focusing strategically on building long-term "Marshall-type plans" to guide future efforts. Given the improbability of an overt deadline shift by President Obama, the U.S. government effort in Afghanistan is left with the choice of continuing to fight one year wars, or forging ahead with developing and implementing long-term comprehensive plans to fix Afghanistan -all the while understanding that, as in previous wars, we will be occupying the ground for a long time to come. As witnessed by the results of the Iraq "surge," success buys time with the American people, evident in the lack of pundit chatter and in polls that indicate declining public interest in Iraq.
Therefore, comprehensive "Marshall-type" planning should accompany security gains derived in the short-term, thereby setting the conditions for the long-term strategy success. The insurgents' freedom of movement in Pakistan's tribal areas
The stark contrast between the relatively modern Iraqi economy and the primitive Afghan economy suggests that even more funding for the Afghans was and is needed. Moreover, when considering the positive impact that building services and manufacturing infrastructure in Iraq contributed to the relative tranquility now enjoyed in that country, increased spending on DIME in counter-insurgency efforts does seem like a way to increase stability. As the global economy founders, the new McCrystal strategy is at risk of failure if it does not receive adequate funding to accomplish its objectives. Simply stated, the failure to provide the means to resource a strategy's ends will doom it to failure, regardless of its merits. 63 remains a significant obstacle to the successful implementation of a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan. U.S. Army counter-insurgency doctrine informs us that "access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies." soldiers and by retooling of Afghan National Security Forces. The short-term security gains from this "surge" can enable a long-term strategy developed in the interim to provide the long-term solutions required to win lasting peace in Afghanistan.
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